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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
__________ 
 
No. 15-2232 
__________ 
 
ROBERT POLSKY; LISA POLSKY, 
                                                      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-00655) 
District Judge:  Honorable Timothy J. Savage 
__________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 25, 2016 
 
Before: SHWARTZ, COWEN, and FUENTES, Circuit 
Judges 
 
 
(Opinion Filed:  December 15, 2016) 
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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
PER CURIAM.  
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 Robert and Lisa Polsky, the parents of a permanently 
disabled daughter, claimed a child tax credit on their 2010 
and 2011 income taxes.  However, the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) disallowed the credit because the Polskys’ 
daughter was too old to qualify for it.   
 
 After a few false starts, the Polskys challenged the 
disallowance of the credit by bringing suit in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
They argued that the tax credit’s definition of “qualifying 
child,” which has an age cap, incorporates by reference a 
different section of the Internal Revenue Code that has no age 
cap at all for a person who is permanently disabled.  The 
Polskys contended that this second definition of “qualifying 
child” overrides the age cap in the child tax credit.  
 
In granting the IRS’s motion to dismiss, the District 
Court held that the plain language of the Code supported the 
IRS’s position: the age cap of the child tax credit section of 
the Code controlled, and the credit was therefore properly 
denied.  Having reviewed the interplay between the two 
sections of the Code, we agree with the District Court and, for 
the reasons set forth below, will affirm its judgment.  
 
I. 
 
 After the Polskys attempted to claim the child tax 
credit for the 2010 and 2011 tax years, the IRS issued them a 
notice of a “mathematical or clerical error”1 disallowing the 
credit because their daughter was older than 17.  In response, 
the Polskys submitted amended returns, specifically 
requesting that the IRS review whether their daughter 
                                              
1   See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(g)(2).   
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qualified for the tax credit.  According to the Polskys, the IRS 
refused to rule on the amended returns because they were 
substantially the same as the original returns.  The Polskys 
next filed a petition in the Tax Court.  The Tax Court 
dismissed the petition, however, because the IRS had not 
issued a notice of deficiency.  See United States v. Mellon 
Bank, N.A., 545 F.2d 869, 873 n.10 (3d Cir. 1976) (“[A] 
notice of deficiency is a jurisdictional prerequisite for a 
taxpayer’s suit in the Tax Court.”).   
 
 In 2014, the Polskys, who have been pro se 
throughout, filed an action in the District Court, alleging that 
the IRS erroneously disallowed the child tax credit and 
violated their due process rights by preventing them from 
challenging the disallowance in Tax Court.2  The United 
                                              
2 The Polskys labeled their filing as a “class action” 
complaint and named Daniel I. Werfel, the IRS’s Acting 
Commissioner, as the sole defendant.  They also moved for 
class certification.  Contrary to the Polskys’ argument on 
appeal, the District Court permissibly evaluated the United 
States’ motion to dismiss before ruling on class certification.  
See Greenlee Cty., Ariz. v. United States, 487 F.3d 871, 880 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (recognizing that courts can grant a motion 
to dismiss without addressing class certification); Searles v. 
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 990 F.2d 789, 790 n.1, 794 (3d Cir. 
1993) (affirming order granting motion to dismiss for failure 
to state a claim, while noting that the “district court did not 
rule on the class certification because it ultimately concluded 
that plaintiff failed to state a claim”); see also 3 William B. 
Rubenstein, Newberg on Class Actions § 7:9 (5th ed. 2013) 
(“Given the early nature of most motions to dismiss, courts 
will often handle them prior to deciding a motion for class 
certification.”).  We note that courts have questioned whether 
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States filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court 
granted.  In particular, the District Court held that the tax 
credit is unavailable when the child has attained age 17 and 
that the Polskys failed to state a constitutional due process 
claim.  Polsky v. Werfel, 87 F. Supp. 3d 748, 758-60, 763-66 
(E.D. Pa. 2015).  The Polskys appealed. 
 
                                                                                                     
laymen pro se litigants may represent a class.  See Fymbo v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 
2000) (holding that the district court did not abuse its 
discretion by deciding that an unincarcerated pro se litigant 
was not an adequate class representative).  The District Court 
also properly substituted the United States for Acting 
Commissioner Werfel.  See 26 U.S.C. § 7422(f)(1)-(2) 
(providing that a suit seeking a tax refund must be brought 
against only the United States, not its officers or employees, 
while allowing party substitution via court-ordered 
amendment of the pleadings); Polsky v. Werfel, 87 F. Supp. 
3d 748, 756-57 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (treating the action as a 
refund suit “[b]ecause the jurisdictional and procedural 
requirements  for filing a refund suit are satisfied”).          
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II.3 
 
  The child tax credit, 26 U.S.C. § 24, allows certain 
taxpayers to claim a credit against tax liability for each 
qualifying child.  A “qualifying child” means “a qualifying 
child of the taxpayer (as defined in section 152(c)) who has 
not attained age 17.”  26 U.S.C. § 24(c)(1) (emphasis added).   
 
 The Polskys did not dispute that their daughter was 
over 17 in 2010 and 2011.  Instead, they argued that they are 
entitled to the child tax credit regardless of their daughter’s 
age because she meets the requirements of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(c), which § 24(c)(1) incorporates by reference.   
Section 152(c) defines “qualifying child” for purposes of a 
taxpayer’s dependency deductions and provides an exception 
to its own age requirements4 for an individual  
who is “permanently and totally disabled.”  26 U.S.C. 
§ 152(c)(3)(B).   
                                              
3 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 
exercise plenary review over the order granting the United 
States’ motion to dismiss.  See Cooper v. Comm’r, 718 F.3d 
216, 220 n.5 (3d Cir. 2013).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, 
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
4 Generally, with respect to the dependency deduction, a 
qualifying child must be under the age of 19 or a student 
under the age of 24.  See 26 U.S.C. § 152(c)(3)(A).  In 
addition, § 152(c)(1) includes requirements pertaining to the  
child’s relationship with the taxpayer, principal place of 
abode, percentage of self-support, and joint filing status.     
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III. 
 
 We agree with the District Court that the Polskys are 
not entitled to a child tax credit for their disabled daughter.  
The age-cap exception in § 152(c)(3) does not supplant the 
separate age limitation in § 24(c)(1).  See Cushman v. Trans 
Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220, 225 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that, 
as a general rule of statutory construction, “[w]e strive to 
avoid a result that would render statutory language 
superfluous, meaningless, or irrelevant”).  To the contrary, 
under the plain and unambiguous language of the Internal 
Revenue Code, the age limitation for the child tax credit in 
§ 24(c)(1) effectively overrides the age requirements and 
exception for claiming a child as a dependent that are found 
in § 152(c)(3).  As the District Court correctly explained:  
 
Section 24 imports the basic qualifications from 
§ 152(c), and adds an age limitation of 
seventeen years.  . . . The age restriction in 
§ 24(c)(1) is intended to end the tax credit when 
the child reaches seventeen years of age.  In 
contrast, the special rule applicable to 
permanently and totally disabled dependents in 
§ 152(c)(3)(B) is calculated to extend the tax 
deduction as long as the child is disabled.  
Therefore, the taxpayer can take a dependent 
deduction regardless of the child’s age as long 
as the child is permanently and totally disabled, 
but cannot receive a tax credit for a disabled 
child who, by the close of the taxable year, was 
seventeen years of age.   
 
Polsky, 87 F. Supp. 3d at 759.  In other words, the child tax 
credit is available only when the “qualifying child” meets the 
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non-age-related requirements of § 152(c) and “has not 
attained age 17.”  26 U.S.C. § 24(c)(1).  Because the Polskys’ 
daughter was over 17 during the relevant tax years, they are 
not entitled to the child tax credit. 
 
 The Polskys also argued that the IRS violated their due 
process rights by failing to issue a notice of deficiency, which 
would have allowed them to seek redress in the Tax Court.  
As a basis for this claim, the Polskys relied on 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  That provision, however, does not apply to federal 
actors, such as IRS employees.  Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 
250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 2001) (“It is well established that 
liability under § 1983 will not attach for actions taken under 
color of federal law.”).  In addition, neither the IRS nor the 
United States can be sued under § 1983.  See Accardi v. 
United States, 435 F.2d 1239, 1241 (3d Cir. 1970) (holding 
that “[t]he United States and other governmental entities are 
not ‘persons’ within the meaning of Section 1983”).  We have 
also held that an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named 
Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), 
“which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of action 
against state actors,” Brown, 250 F.3d at 800, “should not be 
inferred to permit suits against IRS agents accused of 
violating a taxpayer’s constitutional rights.”  Shreiber v. 
Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir. 2000).   
 
 In any event, we agree with the District Court that the 
Polskys’ due process rights were not violated.  Although they 
could not bring their claims in the Tax Court, see 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6213(b)(1) (providing that when a return contains a 
mathematical error, the taxpayer has no right to file a petition 
with the Tax Court), the Polskys’ due process rights were 
protected by their ability under 26 U.S.C. § 7422 to sue for a 
refund.  See Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431, 435 (5th 
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Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (“The refund claim procedure 
provided in section 7422 adequately protects . . . due process 
rights.”).      
 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of 
the District Court.5 
                                              
5 We deny the Polskys’ motions “to consider new evidence” 
and “to consider additional new evidence.”  Our review is 
limited to whether the dismissal of the complaint “was correct 
in light of the facts pleaded in the complaint.”  Maio v. Aetna, 
Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Harris v. City 
of Phila., 35 F.3d 840, 845 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that issues 
raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered).    
  
